


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

**NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS:
Considerations for Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning**

by
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Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Seminar 7



A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College of the Department of the Navy.

Signed: Christopher E. Blanchard

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the conduct of deliberate and crisis action planning for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) of U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities overseas. An interagency operation, a Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) study conducted in 1993 identifies cooperation between the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) as a deficiency in the planning of NEOs. This lack of interagency cooperation adversely impacts the execution of what the author terms politically sensitive, "diplomatic" operations. This, in turn, hinders the ability of both departments to protect and safely evacuate noncombatant American citizens who live and work abroad.

Assigned as the Operations Officer, B Company, Marine Security Guard Battalion, American Consulate General Casablanca, Morocco from June 1986 until June 1988, the author spent these two years supervising and inspecting Marine Security Guard Detachments at 24 embassies and consulate throughout North Africa and the Middle East. The lack of interagency cooperation sighted in the CNA was often evident during visits to embassies and consulates throughout the region. Through this paper, the author hopes to improve DoD - DoS interface by defining the relationship which should exist between the departments in connection with NEO planning. Considerations for unified command and Joint Task Force (JTF) planners are presented in two sections entitled "The Deliberate Planning Process" and "Crisis Action Planning Considerations." The objective is to facilitate the planning process through the identification of these considerations and recommendations to improve the interface between DoS and DoD during NEO planning.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Considerations for Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, predicts that political reinforcement missions, those military actions necessary to protect American lives, property, or interests in foreign countries, will be the most likely contingency operations for U.S. Naval forces and their Marines for the foreseeable future. Conspicuous amongst these possible contingencies is the reinforcement of U.S. diplomatic facilities and the evacuation of American citizens and designated third country nationals (TCNs) from nations experiencing civil unrest, mounting terrorism, or natural disasters, when the host country is unwilling, or unable, to guarantee the safety of foreigners.¹ Myriad articles have been published in military journals describing the events surrounding specific noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Despite these writings and the numerous Department of Defense (DoD) publications concerning the subject, military personnel lack a comprehensive understanding of the very unique nature of NEOs and the planning considerations peculiar to such politically sensitive operations.

Are NEOs politically more sensitive than other types of military operations? Perhaps not, yet commanders assigned to evacuate American citizens from a foreign country will have their actions monitored, or even controlled, at the highest levels within the U.S. government.² Recognition of the political sensitivity of evacuation operations is essential to the conduct of both deliberate and crisis action planning for their execution.

While political concerns may be the paramount consideration in the planning process for NEOs, an understanding of Department of State (DoS) evacuation plans and planning is also critical for planners on a unified command or Joint Task Force (JTF) staff. These staffs must successfully integrate the unified commander's plan with

the Ambassador's evacuation plan during deliberate planning for anticipated NEOs. Likewise, unified command and JTF staffs must be familiar with embassy and consulate evacuation plan development and unique aspects of NEOs which affect crisis action planning.

Why should planning for NEOs be a vital concern for us? The answer is simple: The lives of noncombatant American citizens living and working abroad may depend upon it. Such a reality should instill in military personnel at all levels a keen interest in planning evacuation operations. This examination of NEO planning contains three elements: The political nature of evacuation operations, considerations for deliberate planning, and actions of the Forward Command Element during crisis action planning.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Military or Diplomatic?

Consideration of the political sensitivity of a NEO is, perhaps, the best starting point for an examination of this unique type of military operation. Indeed, the initial question we must ask is if a NEO should be characterized as a military operation at all? Military officers would likely answer yes, that a DoS request for military support to conduct a NEO renders the evacuation a military operation. Yet, a review of a joint publications dealing with NEOs suggests otherwise. NEOs should be considered DoS commanded "diplomatic" operations, characterized by the rapid but short-term employment of military forces in conditions short of war. The military plays a supporting role. For adherents of Clausewitz, who taught that the military is simply an instrument of policy, accepting this premise should not be difficult.

Since DoD plays a supporting role in NEOs, it is essential the military understand diplomatic issues that drive DoS prior to evacuation operations. Inasmuch as the goal of DoS is to remain engaged and promote U.S. national interests abroad, even the preparations preceding a NEO, including a precautionary drawdown of U.S. personnel, may have serious diplomatic and political consequences. To the host government the conduct of an evacuation may signal a lack of U.S. concern with

events within that country. This may lead to a perceived lack of U.S. commitment to assist in resolving the crisis, or a lack of confidence in the host nation's ability to protect American citizens. Such signals may well lead other nations, international agencies, or competing factions within the host nation to react in such a manner as to actually heighten the crisis.³ Indeed, the premature drawdown or evacuation of a diplomatic post may rob the Ambassador of the personnel and resources which may help the U.S. avert the crisis. This action also reduces the ability of the Ambassador to ensure the safety of remaining Americans, such as those assigned to international organizations, and significantly impacts or eliminates the ability of DoS and other agencies to conduct intelligence gathering and reporting activities. In addition, the evacuation of a diplomatic post may cause the loss of U.S. credibility and influence in that nation or region, and result in subsequent difficulties in diplomatic reengagement when the crisis has been resolved. None of this is meant to imply that NEOs should never be conducted, rather it suggests that the political sensitivity of these operations is why they are diplomatic vice military undertakings.

Military personnel often criticize diplomats for postponing drawdown and evacuation decisions, creating situations in which military-assisted evacuations are required, unnecessarily placing military forces and evacuees at risk. Indeed, the military has valid concerns, which need to be expressed to their DoS counterparts and taken into consideration. The military, however, must understand the issues that drive an Ambassador's thinking and timing. It is not simply Ambassadorial whim or poor planning which causes their disinclination to conduct a NEO.

Differing DoS and DoD perspectives regarding NEOs often lead to a lack of interagency cooperation. According to Center for Naval Analysis analyst Adam Seigel, DoS/DoD coordination during NEOs is, "almost without fail, an area with many problems."⁴ And, Seigel is not alone in his assessment of poor DoS/DoD cooperation. A former National Security Council staff member "finds fault not only with State-DoD

cooperation in-country . . . [but] identifies interagency coordination at the operational and tactical levels as 'one of the most neglected aspects of the national security process.'"⁵ Yet this lack of cooperation between DoS and DoD personnel at the operational and tactical levels need not exist. In order to facilitate interagency cooperation, commanders at all levels must understand the delicate nature of NEOs and emphasize this to personnel assigned to the planning and conduct of these politically sensitive operations.

The Deliberate Planning Process

Despite objections by some military personnel, responsibility for the conduct of NEOs rests with DoS, not DoD. Although the unified commander is responsible for all U.S. military activities within his area of responsibility, the Ambassador, not the area military commander, is obligated to protect and if necessary, to evacuate American citizens overseas.⁶ Accordingly, Ambassadors plan for the conduct of NEOs, and they do so using their own deliberate planning process and staff. Ideally, the Ambassador coordinates the development of post evacuation plans with the unified commander, although this coordination does not always occur. The unified commander, for his part, initiates and provides to his own staff emergency evacuation planning guidance for diplomatic and consular facilities. While the military may offer planning guidance and prepare its own evacuation plans, the DoS plan will be executed. As the supporting unit to a diplomatic operation, it is incumbent upon the military to integrate the military evacuation plan within the embassy plan and, if called upon, to successfully execute the Ambassador's plan.

As the agency responsible for the protection and evacuation of American noncombatants abroad, DoS is charged with preparing Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) for each of its diplomatic and consular facilities, and for ensuring the coordination of these plans with other U.S. government agencies represented at these posts.⁷ EAPs address a range of emergencies which may occur at a diplomatic post,

from fires within the Chancery, to demonstrations, to medical emergencies. Yet the evacuation plan generally receives the greatest emphasis.

Department of State Liaison Groups

Centralized and regional DoS offices provide assistance to posts in preparing EAPs. First amongst these is the Washington Liaison Group (WLG). Chaired by a DoS representative, the WLG consists of representatives of DoS, DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and each military department. Other U.S. government agencies may participate as observers to the WLG, which coordinates all NEO planning. The basic responsibility of the WLG is to ensure NEO plans are coordinated across agency lines, and that the plans are executable.

The WLG advises regional liaison groups (RLGs), U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities, and unified commanders regarding the planning and conduct of evacuation operations.⁸ The WLG provides unified commanders a venue for resolving conflicts between DoS and military prepared NEO plans. The WLG regularly reviews the protection and evacuation capabilities of diplomatic posts in relation to the number of noncombatant American citizens residing within a host country. The WLG may recommend a reduction in that number if a growing crisis or intelligence indicators warrant such action.⁹ Again, the WLG, through its military representatives, offers the unified commander the opportunity to influence decisions in advance of the conduct of an actual evacuation by allowing DoD input regarding the total number of noncombatant American citizens in country.

DoS established RLGs provide guidance and coordination to DoS Regional Security Officers (RSOs), the post official normally tasked to lead the development of post evacuation plans. The RLG also assist unified commanders in the preparation and evaluation of military evacuation plans for specific embassies.¹⁰ As with the WLG, the RLGs provide the unified commander an outlet for resolving conflicts in NEO planning. Indeed, DoS appointed political advisors to the unified commanders chair

each RLG. RLG oversight responsibilities generally correspond with the unified commander's area of responsibility. Each RLG remains abreast of the events within the region which might lead to a NEO. They provide coordination between the diplomatic post and military headquarters for both deliberate and crisis action planning.¹¹

Neither the WLG nor the RLGs are responsible for the actual preparation of post evacuation plans. It is the duty of each Ambassador to develop and evaluate such plans, and to identify to the cognizant unified commander the requirements for military support in the event a NEO must be ordered. At each post, the Ambassador usually appoints an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to assist the RSO in drafting the post evacuation plans. The composition of the EAC varies based upon the size of the post and the guidance of the Ambassador. Normally chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), the EAC usually consists of members of the Ambassador's "Country Team," with representatives for the post's administration, security, intelligence, communications, and public affairs sections, as well as the DoD representative, if one is assigned.¹² The prevailing security environment within the host country and the desires of the Ambassador determine the frequency of EAC meetings.

Members of the unified commander's staff charged with planning for NEOs should be intimately familiar with the functions of each member of the EAC. Essentially, the EAC members' responsibilities within the embassy closely correspond with the duties of the unified commander's own staff. Familiarity with these responsibilities facilitates the conduct of both deliberate and crisis action planning.

A copy of the EAP for each diplomatic post within a region should be kept on file at the unified command headquarters. In fact, the maintenance of an updated copy of the EAP is essential to the preparation of the unified command's own embassy and consulate evacuation plans. Regrettably, military planners will likely discover that many, if not most, EAPs are dreadfully out-of-date. Equally troubling will be the task of

sorting through the typically lengthy document for information of significant interest to military planners. The RLG, nonetheless, will assist the unified command staff in obtaining copies of the most current plans prior to the development of the military plan to support the post evacuation plan. Inasmuch as the Joint Operation and Execution Planning System (JOPES) envisions the participation of the entire Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) in the preparation of operations plans, the unified command staff should consult with the RLG throughout the deliberate planning process.

Other significant resources are available to the unified command in the preparation of evacuation plans. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) provides, upon request, "NEOPACKS," complete with maps, charts, and geodesy data to all organizations responsible for the conduct of evacuations. Likewise, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides DoS and military commands with Contingency Support Packages and U.S. Diplomatic Facilities Graphic packages for use in evacuation planning and execution.¹³ Yet military planners do not always coordinate NEO planning with these agencies. This lack of coordination occurred during Operation EASTERN EXIT, the January 1991 evacuation of Americans and TCNs from the U.S. Embassy Mogadishu, Somalia. Helicopter pilots who participated in the operation stated that they needlessly exposed their aircraft, and were delayed in completing their mission, because the maps they were provided were over 20 years old.¹⁴ Lieutenant Colonel W.W. Oates, who commanded the 60 man security force which reinforced the embassy, received his first map of the compound from the Ambassador, only upon Oates's arrival in Mogadishu.¹⁵

Contingency Plans

Although it may prove impossible for the unified commander to prepare detailed NEO plans for each diplomatic post within the region, the military should work with the RLG to develop plans based upon potential evacuation environments, i.e. permissive,

uncertain, or hostile, and an estimate of the number of evacuees from each post.¹⁶ Such advance planning allows the unified commander to fashion force packages appropriate for each operating environment. For example, in a permissive environment no resistance to evacuation operations is anticipated: The operations probably require few American forces in country. Further, the embassy may receive the support of the host nation, or its noninterference at the very least. On the opposite end of the spectrum, an evacuation conducted in a hostile environment may take place in conditions ranging from civil unrest to actual combat conditions. In such an atmosphere a large military force capable of forcible entry, escorting convoys, and establishing defensive perimeters around diplomatic compounds may be required. Military personnel may even be tasked to perform duties normally conducted by DoS personnel, such as personal protection for the Ambassador or performing screening of evacuees.¹⁷ Contingency plans for evacuation operations, although perhaps not post specific, facilitate the crisis action planning process for the military commander appointed to conduct a NEO. In fact, Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, stresses the relationship of deliberate planning to crisis action planning which "includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible."¹⁸

Crisis Action Planning Considerations

When directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to begin planning for the evacuation of a U.S. diplomatic facility, the unified commander may choose to create a JTF. The JTF organization must be carefully considered prior to its creation. Although Marine Amphibious Ready Groups (MARG) provide the commander a force ideally suited and well-trained for the conduct of a NEO, an afloat task force may have limitations on staffing levels and equipment capabilities. Equipment limitations also significantly reduce the ability of a MARG to conduct evacuations from the hinterlands. Conversely, a JTF established in a country neighboring the anticipated NEO site may

not have the same limitations on equipment and personnel, although distance or political considerations may effect the ability of the JTF to conduct its mission.¹⁹

The unified commander must also determine when to designate a force to conduct a NEO. Although NEO planning envisages the rapid introduction of forces followed by a temporary occupation of objectives and a rapid withdrawal, the decision to execute the evacuation plan may not occur for many days or weeks after the force has been designated and placed on alert.²⁰ Conceivably, the operation may not occur at all. Thus, remaining on a NEO tether diverts forces from other contingencies and has readiness implications for the force.

The military commander tasked with the execution of a NEO should make early liaison with members of the post EAC. While this early liaison is essential to planning, the military commander must remember that the continued functioning of the embassy will likely be the paramount concern of DoS and the embassy staff. This staff very well may be severely shorthanded. Why? If warranted by the situation, the Ambassador may have requested and received authorization from DoS to conduct a drawdown of his staff and dependent personnel, generally the first phase of an evacuation process. In fact, DoS anticipates the reduction of personnel during emergency situations. Chiefs of Mission are cautioned, however, to retain sufficient staffing to continue bilateral relations with the host government and to manage the eventual evacuation of American citizens threatened by the crisis, should evacuation become necessary. Nonetheless, once a personnel reduction has been requested and approved, DoS will direct the post to retain no more than 50% of its current staffing.²¹ Therefore, the military commander should not anticipate all members of the EAC to be continuously available during the planning process. This is not to suggest that the embassy EAC is unprepared for the conduct of an emergency evacuation. Quite the opposite is probably true. Members of the EAC are sure to be intimately familiar with the contents and requirements of the post evacuation plan.

The DoS Emergency Planning Handbook provides excellent guidance for the preparation of embassy evacuation plans. Members of the unified commander's J-3 and J-5 sections should familiarize themselves with this document. It details the actions undertaken by an embassy staff during a crisis situation, prior to the arrival of any military support which may have been requested. Similarly, members of the J-3 and J-5 are required to review all DoS EAPs for diplomatic and consular facilities within the region, where it is reasonable to expect a NEO to be required.²² The information contained in the EAP is essential for NEO planning by the military force designated to conduct the operations. At a minimum, all EAPs contain the following information regarding evacuation operations:

- Location of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports, etc.)
- Anticipated number of evacuees
- Location of assembly areas
- Command posts
- Key personnel (name, locations, means of contact)
- Description of embassy communication system
- Description of embassy transportation assets
- Description of the warden system (notification process for emergencies)
- Class I supplies on hand at the embassy²³

If events in a country warrant the special convening of an embassy EAC, these events will not go unnoticed by the unified commander. Even in the absence of a formal DoS request to prepare for a NEO, the unified commander may prepare to direct the employment of a liaison team from the force designated to conduct the operation. The assigned force commander will, when directed, make contact and begin planning through the deployment of an advance liaison team, the forward command element.²⁴

The Forward Command Element (FCE)

The FCE interfaces with members of the embassy staff, usually members of the EAC. The composition of the FCE should vary based upon such factors as the security

environment, i.e. permissive, uncertain, or hostile, the physical location of the diplomatic facility, and the size of the evacuation force. The make up of the FCE for the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), or MEU (SOC), during Operation SHARP EDGE - embassy security and evacuation operations in Monrovia, Liberia in August 1990 - provides an excellent example of matching highly-qualified personnel to the expected FCE missions. Headed by the infantry battalion executive officer, the FCE included a radio operator, the officer in charge (OIC) of the Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), who was an aviator, and the OIC of the SEAL detachment.²⁵ Given the expected taskings of the FCE, its composition was ideal.

The 22nd MEU FCE conducted four essential planning missions. Expect to complete these tasks during the planning phase of evacuation operations.

- Evaluation and reconnaissance of Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs)
- Evaluation of potential Beach Landing Sites (BLSs)
- Evaluation of Assembly Areas
- Drafting an American Embassy Reinforcement Plan²⁶

The embassy EAP identifies HLZs, BLSs and assembly areas. Selection of these locations is usually made by the post RSO, a professionally trained security officer. The ability of the RSO to make sound tactical assessments should not be underestimated. Many, if not most, RSOs have served in the U.S. armed forces. Others supervise local or contract guard forces as large as a typical infantry company. Further, the RSO probably enlisted the assistance of one of the many Foreign Area Officers (FAO) serving at U.S. embassies in security assistance billets or in the defense attache system. As members of the EAC, FAOs generally become intimately involved in the planning and execution of evacuation operations. During the evacuation of the American Embassy Rangoon, Burma in 1988, the Ambassador designated a FAO as the lead project officer for both the planning and execution of the

evacuation.²⁷ Despite the acknowledged competence of the post RSO, the FCE should expect to conduct the necessary essential taskings.

The reconnaissance and evaluation of HLZs, BLSs and assembly areas should be closely coordinated with the U.S. embassy staff. In truth, it would probably prove difficult for the FCE to conduct a unilateral analysis of these locations. Several planning factors must be considered in the selection of these sites. Paramount amongst these factors is an understanding that the assembly areas designated by the embassy EAP are those to which potential evacuees will move in a crisis situation unless otherwise informed. Embassies routinely test and evaluate their EAPs, and a deviation from the practiced plan may cause great confusion. Nonetheless, the prevailing security environment may render the designated assembly areas untenable. A second critical factor is the time it will take to gather evacuees in the assembly areas.²⁸ Inasmuch as the assembly area and evacuation site may not be the same place, the routes and transportation to be used to move the evacuees from the assembly area to the evacuation site generate a third planning consideration. Consult embassy personnel, other American citizens, and Host Country Nationals designated for evacuation to determine potential choke points along the route. A fourth planning consideration is the security requirements based upon the location of the assembly areas, the ability of evacuees to reach the assembly area, and security along the routes from the assembly area to evacuation sites. Again, each of the four planning factors considered in selecting assembly areas and evacuation sites should be closely coordinated with members of the embassy staff.

Perhaps the single most important consideration affecting all evacuation operations is the reliability of the host nation military and security forces. Specifically, if the host nation forces possess the capability and willingness to support the evacuation, the requirement for American military assistance may be minimal. Consultation of the embassy staff by the FCE will be required to make such

assessments. Similarly, in periods of civil unrest opposition forces may pose a threat to the evacuation. Again, the FCE must interact with the embassy staff to evaluate the situation.

Embassy Reinforcement Plans

An expected planning task of the FCE, the implementation of which may proceed the conduct of an evacuation, is the drafting of an embassy reinforcement plan. DoS may, at the request of the Ambassador, or on the recommendation of the WLG or an RLG, take actions to enhance the security of the facility while planning for the conduct of a NEO. Such actions may include reinforcement by additional Marine Security Guards or additional personnel from the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The FCE should take care not to get involved in embassy security operations unless requested. The principle of civilian authority over embassy security - including its Marine Security Guards - is maintained at all U.S. diplomatic facilities. Once requested, however, the FCE will work closely with the RSO to develop a reinforcement plan in the days before the arrival of the MEU or other evacuation force. The plan will be contingent upon many factors, yet the drafting of a defensive plan for the embassy may be the most familiar aspect of the entire planning process to military personnel. The plan must, however, consider the integration of the Marine Detachment and any security forces under the RSO's supervision.²⁹

A formal security relationship exists between the Marine Corps and DoS that has its roots in the first Memorandum of Agreement signed between the agencies in 1948. Under that agreement, which is reviewed and updated biannually, the Marine Corps agreed to assign enlisted Marines to provide internal security at U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. This habitual relationship has led DoS in recent years to request specialized Marine security forces to augment embassy security in Somalia, Haiti and Liberia. The use of quick-response Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST) from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion has proven very effective in performing

these missions. Consider the employment of FAST when drafting embassy reinforcement plans.

Rules of Engagement

Perhaps the most contentious issue to be resolved by the FCE will be the development of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be exercised by the military forces. Although the military commander must provide security for his force and for evacuees, the Ambassador may insist upon constraints to the use of force based upon the political sensitivity of each situation. Indeed, the military commander should remain aware that NEOs are politically sensitive operations and are monitored or controlled at the highest levels of the U.S. government.³⁰ Further, in a permissive environment, or in any environment in which the host government continues to exercise authority within the country, the host nation itself may impose ROE constraints affecting U.S. forces.³¹ DoD admonishes Joint Task Force Commanders (CJTF) assigned to conduct NEOs to be prepared to protect both the military force and evacuees without having the authority to preempt hostile acts through the use of proactive military action. ROE, the military is cautioned, are "usually based upon national strategic and political considerations vice tactical requirements."³² If, upon reporting back to the CJTF, military leaders determine that the ROE imposed by the Ambassador are too restrictive for the operating environment, requests from the unified commander for modifications to the ROE will be submitted to the NCA for approval.³³

Conclusion and Recommendations

The conduct of deliberate and crisis action planning for NEOs in support of U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities must consider the politically sensitive nature of these unique operations. Military planners, both those assigned to unified command staffs and members of a JTF tasked to conduct an evacuation, should understand that NEOs are "diplomatic" operations supported by military forces. This perspective must be fostered by commanders at all levels and should likewise be reflected in joint and

service publications relating to NEO planning and execution. Further, military planners must recognize the differences inherent in DoS and DoD missions: For DoS the use of the military is often the diplomatic instrument of last resort.

Several planning considerations must be emphasized again as well.

- Integrate the military evacuation plan with that of the diplomatic post, remembering that the Ambassador's plan will be the one executed.
- Utilize liaison groups at the unified command and JCS levels to express military reservations about specific aspects of a DoS generated evacuation plan.
- Review the DoS Emergency Planning Handbook and the evacuation plans for the diplomatic and consular facilities in countries from which a NEO may reasonably be expected. This facilitates the conduct of both deliberate and crisis action planning on the part of military personnel.
- Provide military input and support to the development of EAPs at diplomatic and consular facilities within the unified command area of responsibility.
- Know and understanding of the functions of the embassy staff. This enhances interagency cooperation, particularly during a crisis situation.
- Develop contingency evacuation plans based upon the security environment as this will significantly improve crisis action planning.

Although DoS is responsible for the protection and, if required, the evacuation of noncombatant American citizens overseas, DoD is charged with supporting these missions. U.S. military commanders and Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities must fully integrate their efforts during the planning of noncombatant evacuation operations. Americans lives depend upon it.

NOTES

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